New developmentalism in Brazil? The need for sectoral analysis by Doering, Heike et al.
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/97794/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Doering, Heike, Santos, Rodrigo Salles Pereira dos and Pocher, Eva 2017. New developmentalism
in Brazil? the need for sectoral analysis. Review of International Political Economy 24 (2) , pp.




Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
 1 | P a g e  
 





This article provides an analysis of the uneven practices and outcomes of new 
developmentalism in Brazil. New developmentalism has been described as a hybrid 
approach to development. It combines liberal practices of privatization and export 
orientation with state intervention to achieve social inclusion and economic 
development. Academic and policy literatures have repeatedly debated the conditions 
under which development takes place and have particularly focused on the role of the 
state. So far, discussions have predominantly concentrated on economic developments.  
We focus on the trajectories of new developmentalism in three strategic sectors in the 
Brazilian economy: oil, mining and steel, with particular emphasis on the steel industry. 
We contribute to the debate by paying equal attention to economic and social outcomes 
in these three sectors. We conclude that new developmentalism is sectorally specific. 
In the extractive sectors, export competitiveness translates into high wages. In steel, in 
contrast, new developmentalism  brings economic benefits to some but social benefits 
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1. Introduction  
 
Interest in the relationship between business and the state in the post-
Washington Consensus era has been increasing recently (Mazzucato 2014; Wood and 
Wright 2015). There have been calls for bringing business as an actor more prominently 
into discussions of political economy (Schneider 2014), bringing the state into 
discussions of global production networks and global value chains (Neilson, Pritchard 
and Yeung 2014) and a ‘recoupling of political and economic spheres’ (Roberts 2014: 
18). The question remains: under which paradigm of business - state relations does 
development take place? The debate has been applied to both developed and emerging 
economies. This article contributes to these discussions by focusing on business-state 
relations in Brazil. Recent accounts of emerging economies have described the 
interplay between state and market as a ‘hybrid’ between market-oriented and state-
oriented economic approaches (Ban 2013). In this article, we regard the policy 
paradigm of new developmentalism in Brazil as one example of such hybrid approaches 
(Ban 2013) and examine its potentially uneven effects for different actors in one 
strategic sector, the steel industry.  
In the hybrid paradigm, political actors combine continued strong state 
intervention in strategic sectors with a focus on liberalisation of markets, 
internationalisation of ‘national champions’ (especially in sectors extracting natural 
resources) and an increasing integration of emerging economies (such as Brazil) into 
global production and finance networks.  Recent political and economic developments 
- turmoil in Chinese financial markets or the change in government in Brazil - have 
increased interest in the outcomes of these hybrid approaches. Despite their stated goals 
of social inclusion, there have been voices warning of the extractivist nature of such 
policies (see for example Roberts 2014, Faletti 2014; Milanez and Santos 2015). This 
calls into question the potential of new developmentalism for economic as well as social 
development.  
Development in the Latin American context has been dominant as discourse, as 
well as in practice and theory (Hochstetler and Montero 2013; Luna, Morrilo and 
Schrank 2014). In all of these respects, the role of the state is both prominent and 
contested.  Previously, the dominant historical narrative with regard to emerging 
economies was one of diminishing state intervention and increasing convergence with 
the free market policies of Western liberal democracies (Luna, Morillo and Schrank 
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2014). The Brazilian state could be regarded as representative of such shifts – from 
economic nationalism and developmentalism in the 1930s to projects of neoliberalism 
at the end of the 20th century. In the last five years, however, this discourse of 
convergence has been overcome by a growing emphasis on diversity and varieties of 
capitalism (Schneider 2013, Ban and Blyth 2013). The Brazilian government’s 
seemingly interventionist attitude since 2002 has been seen as indicative of the decline 
of the Washington Consensus orthodoxy of liberalization and privatization (Galantucci 
2014, Arbix and Martin 2010, Kröger 2012, Nölke et al. 2014). In Brazil, there has not 
only been widespread criticism of the neoliberal model, there has also been increased 
effort to establish ‘New Developmentalism’ (Bresser Pereira 2006, 2016, Erber 2008, 
2010, 2011, Arbix and Martin 2010) as a policy discourse as well as practice.  
The term New Developmentalism is contested. It is closely associated with the 
Brazilian governments led by the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) under Luis Inazio 
Lula da Silva (Lula, 2002 – 2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2010 – 2016). Here, it is a direct 
translation from the Portuguese ‘Novo Desenvolvimentismo’. This follows the use by 
L.C. Bresser-Pereira (2006, 2016), and F.S. Erber (2008, 2010, 2011).1 In its main 
characteristics, it accepts the need for state intervention to achieve modernization 
through internationalization. Development is achieved through state support of selected 
industries focusing on the competitiveness of their exports and entrance into global 
production networks. This is complemented by “an equitable distribution of the 
resulting rent, making the growth socially inclusive” (Ebenau and Liberatore 2013: 
107) or a “new social contract” in which economic development leads to social 
development (Ricz 2015, see also Ban 2013, Nölke et al. 2014, Milanez and Santos 
2015).  
Previous accounts in the literature on Brazil have emphasised the persistence of 
state involvement and the resulting strength of selected strategic, particularly export-
oriented, sectors: e.g. extractive industries (Nem Singh 2014, Massi and Nem Singh 
2016, Milanez and Santos 2015), paper and pulp (Kröger 2012) and aircraft 
manufacturing (Monteiro 2011). In contrast, there have been no detailed analyses of the 
                                               
1
 Erber, in particular, points out the differences between neo-developmentalismand new 
developmentalism. Neo-developmentalism is considered to be a repetition of the developmentalism of 
the 1950s to 1970s. New developmentalism shares some characteristics but is distinct in others as the 
discussion below will demonstrate. Other labels suggested in the academic literature have been neo-
structuralism (Leiva 2008)  and neo-Mercantilism (Kröger 2012). Arbix and Martin (2010) favour 
‘inclusionary state activism’ to encourage aattention to both social and economic state roles. .  
 
shape and effect of new developmentalist policies in the Brazilian steel industry despite 
its  strategic importance (Almeida 2009). We argue that a detailed sectoral analysis can 
make the uneven implementation and effect of state involvement visible.  With Brazil 
in its worst recession in recent history (FT, 1 June 2016) and a global steel crisis, it 
seems an opportune moment to assess Brazil’s new developmentalist approach in this 
sector.   
These observations lead to the questions that frame the present paper: How is 
the Brazilian hybrid economic policy approach articulated in strategic sectors? How 
can we evaluate the new developmentalist paradigm in the Brazilian steel industry? 
Steel has always been considered a strategic industry and while “the era of ‘big steel’ 
in Western Europe is over” (FT 21 May 2011), it has been an integral driver of growth 
in the economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Korea. However, different 
locations within the steel production network are facing different challenges: the 
transition to steel-making as a knowledge-intensive and high-tech industry in the old 
steel regions of the US and Europe as compared to the expansion of steel production to 
meet demands in the emerging steel producing countries such as China, Brazil and 
India. This restructuring of the world steel industry could also lock emerging countries 
into existing uneven patterns of development (Instituto Brasileiro de Siderurgia 2007). 
Therefore, steel needs to be considered at the centre of both the processes of value 
creation, enhancement and capture, and the politics and policies of development. As 
‘industrial policies are irreducibly political and context-specific’ (Saad-Filho 2010: 3), 
attention also needs to be directed to the global regimes of steel production. Brazilian 
industrial policies are then both internally and externally determined (Ebenau and 
Liberatore 2013).  
The following section will provide a brief history of development paradigms 
and a review of discussions of new developmentalism at a national level. We provide 
an overview of new developmentalist approaches in the extractive industries as these 
have been the focus of previous accounts. Then our discussion of steel provides a 
complementary narrative of new developmentalism and extends the previously 
economically oriented analyses by adding the social dimension. Finally, we conclude 
that new developmentalism is sectorally specific. In  each sector, there are winners and 
losers. In the extractive industries, export competitiveness of Brazilian national 
champions has been translated into wage rises. In steel, in contrast, new 
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developmentalism brings economic benefits to some but social benefits to few. Thus it 
is a paradigm of development but it is not wholly developmental. 
 
 
2. New developmentalism in Brazil  
This section provides an insight into what is new about new developmentalism and how 
we can operationalise it to evaluate its practices and outcomes in the steel sector. It is 
important to locate recent economic policies in their historical context, identifying 
continuities as well as ruptures. This follows the notion of the double movement 
suggested by Polanyi (1944) that periods of state intervention are followed by periods 
of market dominance and vice versa. The latest measures cannot be a simple revival of 
previous policies but “each epoch of state or market dominance is essentially different 
from its historical precursors” (Wood and Wright 2015: 272).  
Developmentalism and the developmental state have received significant 
attention and a number of common characteristics across states have been identified 
(Ban 2013). These comprise the importance of economic nationalism in a world in 
which nation states are in competition with each other through domestic firms. 
Economic nationalism is  manifested in policy measures such as protectionism (e.g. 
tariffs), a focus on import substitution through state provision of physical, economic 
and social capital as well as the prominence of state ownership in selected sectors (Ban 
2013, Evans 1995). In Latin America, developmentalism was dominant from the 1930s 
until the 1970s with two distinct phases of, first, pragmatic import substitution 
industrialisation following the global economic crisis of 1929-31 and, second, a phase 
of ideological developmentalism from the 1950s onwards (Haber 2006).  State 
regulation was not only seen as a business necessity but its intervention in industrial 
transformation became a political and military objective. While there were clear 
variations across sectors (Baer 1972), Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) 
favoured a particular form of inter-firm and intra-firm relationships. In addition to state-
owned enterprises in oil, mining, steel and chemicals, large, vertically integrated 
transnational corporations benefited from ISI policies and became key players in most 
international industries (Gereffi 2013). 
These years of developmentalism were followed by several liberalizing projects 
across Latin America, driven forward by the debt crises of the 1980s and the 
accompanying demands of international financial institutions as well as 
democratization trends across the continent. Free market capitalism as imagined in the 
Washington Consensus was to be achieved by a reshaping of state action away from 
active intervention towards facilitating liberalization of trade, privatization, the removal 
of entry barriers for outside investors and competitors as well as the deregulation of 
financial and labour markets (Ban 2013).  
From the mid-1980s onwards, the Brazilian state seemed to follow these 
prescriptions as figure 1 below demonstrates.    
 
FIGURE 1: Brazil’s Reforms about here  
  
 
While the rise of neoliberalism brought with it a narrative of the state 
withdrawing from markets, increasingly, authors have pointed not only to the necessity 
for an active state role in development or so-called free-market capitalism but also to 
its empirical reality (Wood and Wright 2015, Gereffi 2013, Mazzucato 2013). We 
examine ownership structures in the oil, mining and steel sector to discuss this below. 
In particular, the new forms of statism have been seen not to be less interventionist but 
rather increasingly interventionist in the service of selected, private interests (Wood 
and Wright 2015). The interdependence between policy paradigms and corporate 
strategies comes to the fore here. Changes in the role and practices of the state appear 
alongside changes in the organization of production by transnational companies.  
“Openness to trade and foreign investment” (Gereffi 2013: 8) determines countries’ 
positions in global value chains and therefore their opportunities for social and 
economic upgrading (or development). The increased fragmentation of production in a 
globalized world “offers a new logic of value creation” via production stage 
specialization (Breznitz and Zysman 2013: 37).The rise of global production networks 
and shifts in the nature of global value chains then raises the question of how state 
actors  
integrate in value chains in a way that allows for incorporation of a growing 
number of the workforce and increasing levels of productivity and outcomes. 
This calls for a balanced approach which takes both competitiveness and equity 
issues into account. (Altenburg 2007: 4)  
We examine the ways in which the Brazilian state managed its insertion into global 
production networks by looking into different modes of internationalization across the 
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sectors. In particular, we refer to different waves of industrial policy in Brazil between 
2002 and 2014. We also question to what extent the state succeeded in harnessing the 
resulting capital flows for national development rather than a servicing of domestic and 
foreign capital interests. We include this in our analysis by examining income data as 
well as linkages to civil society as equity has so far been neglected in discussions of 
new developmentalism in oil and mining. 
In a world which is characterised by international competition and global production 
networks, the state’s industrial policies need to adjust; so far, so well rehearsed (see 
Devlin and Moguillansky 2012). In addition, new roles of the state in its relation with 
business have been presented as not only a manifestation of neo-liberalism (Wood and 
Wright 2015) but also as evidence for post-neoliberal ideological and policy projects 
or what has been seen as a distinctly Latin American response to neoliberal pressures 
(Yates and Bakker 2014, Brenner et al. 2010). Similarly, China has attracted attention 
for its approach to development alongside capitalism, rather than an all-out adoption of 
capitalist practices. While all of these practices can be summarised under the umbrella 
of new statism, they differ in their understanding of inclusion and participation. This is 
particularly important in the Latin American context. Neo-liberalism accepts the 
exclusion of large parts of society from decision-making and the benefits of ‘growth’. 
In contrast, post-neoliberal projects focus on reviving citizenship via a new politics of 
participation to achieve a solidarity economy (Devlin and Moguillansky 2012, Ebenau 
and Liberatore 2013, Yates and Bakker 2014, Ricz 2015).  
In Brazil’s new developmentalism this means that the state’s role goes beyond 
industrial policy to produce social cohesion through an increased emphasis on 
redistribution, poverty alleviation and participation of citizens in decision-making. 
Critical voices have highlighted that the ambitious aims of global competitiveness 
coupled with social inclusion have, however, led to increased inequality in access to 
politics, capital goods, and means of production, in particular land (Kröger 2012).      
The following table (table 1) locates Brazilian New Developmentalism in its 
historical context to demonstrate continuities and breaks with past developmental 
paradigms.  
 
TABLE 1: Paradigms of Development in Brazil about here 
 
 Industrial and economic policies implemented in the varying approaches to 
development have one thing in common: they have sectorally specific outcomes (Saad-
Filho 2010). Although the rise of fragmented production has called into doubt the 
importance of sectors (Huberty 2013), we illustrate the interaction between different 
approaches to development via state action and the internal structure of an industry in 
the following sections.  
 
3. New developmentalism as resource nationalism: oil and mining  
The following is the story of mining and oil as it has been told, in parts, before 
(Nem Singh 2014, Nem Singh and Massi 2016, Almeida et al. 2014, Paz 2015, Milanez 
and Santos 2015). The similarities and differences between these sectors are instructive. 
This section of the article therefore focuses on comparing  instruments and outcomes 
of new developmentalism in Brazil, with regard to ownership, internationalization, 
employment and social participation. In contrast to the steel sector, both oil and mining 
were dominated by one central, state-owned company until the mid-1990s, Petrobras 
and Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD, now Vale), respectively. In both cases, the 
natural resources have been considered of strategic importance to the country’s 
development.  The trajectory of reforms and subsequent regulation, however, have 
taken divergent routes while facilitating a strong continued influence of the state.  
Under state ownership, CVRD was the dominant symbol of national development. 
Large scale export of iron ore produced the foreign currency necessary for the viability 
of Brazilian steel production, dependent as it was on imported coke and on US loans. 
After privatisation in 1997, CVRD (renamed Vale) became one of the most important 
players in the formation of a global market for iron ore. The privatization of Vale was 
controversial with the Workers’ Party (PT), questioning the need for privatization given 
the efficient and successful performance of the company (Nem Singh and Massi 2016). 
Privatization went ahead, however, with the government retaining a golden share and 
therefore veto powers in the strategic decisions of the company. At the same time, the 
market was opened up for foreign capital. The regulatory framework has allowed 
foreign companies to develop and exploit mineral resources in Brazil, and foreign 
investment into the sector has been at a high level with over 500 transnational 
operations establishing themselves between 1990 and 2008 (Nem Singh and Massi 
2016). Nevertheless, Vale continues to dominate iron ore production in Brazil, 
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producing 79.8% of the total and having minority stakes in two of the three companies 
producing the remaining 20.2 % (CSN and Samarco) (Gurmendi 2010: 4.2). Between 
2001 and 2015, Vale continuously ranked in the top three export companies in Brazil. 
In terms of export quantity and export value, Vale’s performance between 2001 and 
2014 has been one of continuous improvement (see also table 2 below). In 2014 it  
accounted for 9.1% of Brazil’s exports despite a 22.7% drop in exports compared to 
the previous year (Ministerio  do Desenvolvimento, Industria e Comercio Exterior 
2015).  
In the oil sector, Petrobras remained state owned and regulation and oversight over 
oil production remain the prerogative of the Brazilian government. Until 1997, 
Petrobras retained monopoly rights over oil production. These regulations were 
loosened and allowed foreign capital to enter the market, so by 2010 around 50% of the 
companies operating in the oil market were foreign-owned (Nem Singh 2013). Similar 
to the mining sector, however, the arrival of foreign capital has been encouraged under 
tight parameters which ultimately continue to favour the domestic giants. Petrobras 
continues to dominate activities along the oil value chain and, until 2014, has remained 
a sought after partner by international oil companies. Despite state ownership, the 
company enjoyed a reputation of efficient management and performance (Almeida et 
al. 2014). Until news of the corruption scandal broke in 2014-5, it had also been seen 
as  autonomous from the state and seemed to be exemplary of Evans’ (1995) notion of 
‘embedded autonomy’ (Almeida et al. 2014). Similar to Vale, Petrobras has been 
central to Brazil’s trade balance, performing as one of the top export companies during 
2001 – 2015. Similar to Vale, export performance in terms of quantity and value has 
seen steady increases over the period. In 2014, it still contributed  5.79% of Brazil’s 
exports to the trade balance (MDIC 2015) even though this marked a significant decline 
from an average of mining and oil together contributing 20% of exports in the period 
1994 – 2008 (Nem Singh and Massi 2016). Table 2 below provides the comparison of 
these economic indicators on a company level between oil, mining and steel.  
Consecutive industrial policies (Policy of industrial technology and foreign trade 
(PITCE, 2003-07), Policy of Productive Development (PDP, 2008-10) and Plan Greater 
Brazil (PBM, 2011 – 14)) have shaped corporate strategies in the oil and mining sectors 
in two ways: (1) prioritizing internationalisation at at the same time (2) domestic 
companies’ responsibility to the nation. Both, Vale and Petrobras, have been actively 
following internationalization strategies through global investment and joint ventures 
with foreign partners (Souza 2011). For instance, in 2005, Vale established a joint 
venture with the German Thyssen Krupp AG to build a steel mill able to produce 5 
million tons of slab per year, Companhia Siderúrgica do Atlântico (TKCSA) in the 
industrial district of Santa Cruz, Rio de Janeiro state. The semi-finished steel produced 
in this coastal location is shipped to either the TK plant in Calvert, Alabama (60%) or 
the finishing plants in Duisburg and Bochum, Germany (40%). The management of this 
dispersed network of production is based in Rotterdam, Netherlands and the whole 
organisation is described as ‘virtual integrated steel plant’ (Matthews, 2010). TKCSA, 
thus, constituted a key component in the strategies of transnationalisation for both Vale 
and TK. In this way, ThyssenKrupp was able to operate the labour and resource-
intensive stages of production in an environment characterised by low labour and 
transport costs. Vale succeeded in integrating itself into the global steel production 
network (via a secure market for its iron ore) but also in establishing and stabilising the 
position of Brazil in the global economic system. The project, however, was hampered 
by spiralling costs, criticism by activist shareholder groups and the onset of the financial 
crisis so that Vale divested itself of its stake by May 2016. 
This strategy of internationalisation has been facilitated through support by the 
Brazilian development bank (BNDES) which has proved a central actor of the state in 
new developmentalism. It offered financial backing for internationalization projects but 
also loans to prop up domestic operations and developments for Vale and Petrobras 
(Almeida 2009, Hochstetler and Montero 2013). This enabled the channeling of 
company funds into the acquisition of foreign assets and expansion in Brazil’s regions 
rather than day-to-day operations. BNDES, in these cases, acted as a development 
agency rather than as a bank. In particular, through its provision of funds for industrial 
projects in the economically disadvantaged North and Northeast of Brazil, it helped 
transform both Petrobras and Vale into instruments of regional policy for the Lula 
government, particularly since Lula’s second term in office (2007-2010). Here, the state 
exerted pressure to achieve a socially inclusive distribution of economic opportunities 
and benefits to address long-standing patterns of regional inequality in Brazil. 
According to the right-wing Brazilian press, Roger Agnelli (CEO of Vale 2001 – 2011) 
and his executive team “turned Vale into a moneymaking machine – only to realize that 
the company remains under the yoke of government” (Souza, 2011). Vale’s 
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involvement in a range of steel developments since the beginning of the 2000s is an 
illustration of these pressures.  
The Aços Laminados do Pará (ALPA) development is one such example of a 
project of decidedly political character. ALPA’s location was planned for the Industrial 
District of Marabá, in Pará in the Eastern Amazon, at a significant distance from major 
transport and distribution links (Durão 2013). The company was expected to generate 
about 4,000 direct and another 16,000 indirect jobs (Souza, 2011).  Based on limited 
process technology and being majorly export-oriented, projects like ALPA are 
predominantly designed for coastal regions. Despite its unsuitable location, both the 
Federal and the State of Pará governments exerted overwhelming pressure on Vale’s 
former CEO, Roger Agnelli to invest in the area. ALPA thus recalls earlier projects of 
industrialisation in strategically inconvenient but politically expedient places for the 
development of the nation.   
In a similar vein, Petrobras has been used to contribute to the development of 
the capital goods and shipbuilding industry in Brazil. From 2003 onwards, the 
government made it clear that profit was not to be Petrobras’ overriding motive 
(Almeida et al. 2014). Lula suggested that Petrobras should not focus on the savings 
that procuring oil rigs abroad would bring but on the benefits to the local and national 
economy via employment, wages and taxes (Almeida et al 2014, Safatle et al 2009). It 
has invested into a number of refinery projects in the Northeast of the country. In 
addition, its procurement policies aimed to maximise local content in equipment 
through  the Program of the Mobilization of the Oil and Gas Industry (Programa de 
Mobilização da Indústria de Petróleo e Gás Natural, PROMINP) . PROMINP operates 
as a forum for Petrobras, employers’ organisations in the sector and the government to 
discuss and develop activities in the areas of industrial policy, training and performance 
monitoring.  This forum has been considered effective in exchanging information on 
future demand as well as needs in capacity building (Almeida et al. 2014). These 
examples demonstrate how in both oil and mining, the state exerts its control over the 
business actors through both direct and indirect means. The state thus remains in its 
‘traditional’ role through complex patterns of ownership but employs discourses of 
private responsibility in the interests of the nation.  
In terms of employment and wages, the extractive sector has been impressive in its 
performance. Nominal as well as real wages have steadily risen and at a higher rate than 
in any other sector (see table 2 and figure 3 below). In contrast to the steel sector, the 
wage profile has not substantially changed with proportions of low, middle and high 
income earners remaining almost constant between 1995 and 2015.  Despite attempts 
to use Vale and Petrobras to achieve a more even regional economic development, the 
South East outperformed the other regions in its higher proportion of high income 
earners. In that sense, investment in mining and oil in the Northeast and the North may 
have contributed to increased employment but not necessarily to a change in the spatial 
patterns of the income distribution. In addition to the increase in income for workers in 
the industry, government policies have explicitly aimed to facilitate capacity building 
and in this sense economic and social upgrading in the sector (Almeida et al. 2014). In 
contrast to the positive performance of investment and wages, both the oil and mining 
industries continue to have an accountability problem. The dominant position of 
Petrobras and Vale have made them prominent targets for NGOs demanding an increase 
in transparency. Vale, in particular, has been subject to a range of campaigns. Strategies 
addressing public actors (Office of the Public Prosecutor), private actors (critical 
shareholder groups) and civil society actors (publicity campaigns) have been used to 
highlight and question Vale’s corporate strategies and their socio-environmental 
impacts. National and international networks of protest have evolved to address the 
potentially negative effects of extractive industries. Examples here are Coalition on 
Mining and Steelmaking Working Group of the Brazilian Network for Environmental 
Justice, The International Network of People Affected by Vale and the National 
Committee for the Defense of Territories against Mining. Vale has been subject to 
disruption of its operational activities, the publication of ‘Unsustainability Reports’ and 
contestation by critical shareholder groups (Santos and Milanez, 2015).  Petrobras has 
similarly been at the centre of public attention. Recent corruption scandals, such as the 
‘lava jato’ investigation, have highlighted the dangers of very close personal relations 
between government ministers, party officials and the business elite. In this sense, a 
politicization of both sectors has been noticed in the literature (Nem Singh and Massi 
2016, Almeida et al. 2014). These developments show that the state continues to be 
involved in activities which seriously undermine its claims of an equitable and inclusive 
development aiming to redistribute wealth and foster participation by all. This section 
has demonstrated that new developmentalist objectives of combined economic and 
social upgrading in the strategic sectors of oil and mining have been in tension with 
market pressures. At the same time, the international competitiveness of the dominant 
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domestic companies (Vale and Petrobras) have presented differentiated opportunities 
to drive forward a developmentalist agenda. It is important to point out, however, that 
the high point of their developmental activities occurred in the context of political 
stability (under Lula and Dilma’s first administration) and high commodity prices. The 
next section provides a comparative account for the steel sector.  
 
 
4. Steel as a national champion in the era of new developmentalism in Brazil?  
 
In line with the literature on other sectors  (Paz 2015, Nem Singh 2012, 2014, 
Kröger 2012, Ban 2013), this article highlights continuities of state involvement – albeit 
by different means – through the period of neoliberalisation (Amann et al., 2006).  New 
developmental practice in the steel sector were thus shaped by path dependencies. It is 
therefore necessary to give a short introduction to the structure of the Brazilian industry, 
in itself and in relation to the global industry to make visible the windows of 
opportunity (or their absence) for particular industrial policies and state projects.  
The privatisation of the Brazilian steel industry took place in the context of a 
wave of privatisation in the global steel industry. From the 1980s to the end of the 
1990s, the proportion of steel world production by state owned enterprises fell from 
70% to 20%. In Brazil, the process began in 1988 with the sale of small specialised 
steel producers. What followed was the wholesale transfer of the iron and steel industry 
to the private sector by 1993 as part of a wider programme of the privatization of public 
assets (Baumann 2001). The process was characterised by the dominance of Brazilian 
banks which saw it as lucrative investment (Amann et al. 2006)2, limited foreign capital 
involvement (40% ceiling on purchases of voting stock) and a continued presence of 
the state as provider of capital through the National Development Bank (BNDES) 
(Amann, 2004). Not only did it favour national business groups (grupos) but the 
traditional structure of Brazilian business, characterised by concentrated ownership 
(blockholding), diversification, and family ownership, advantaged large domestic firms 
in the 1990s. In particular, grupos benefited from a preferential access to information 
as result of complex webs of social relations and policies designed to support domestic 
                                               
2
 The profits generated by a number of banks once they divested their shares in the following rounds of 
mergers and acquisitions in the industry support this, e.g. Bamerindus realised a 181% profit selling its 
stake in CSN (Amann et al. 2006). 
capital and the “national bourgeoisie” (Schneider, 2008). The result was a concentration 
of assets (through complex cross-holdings between Brazilian companies) rather than 
promoting the exoneration of unprofitable firms by the state, or in other words, an 
increase in concentration rather than competition (Amann and Baer, 2006). Between 
1991 and 1995, the industry as a whole shed 26.6% of employees (Andrade et al. 1997). 
Despite increases in productivity as result of this significant reduction in manpower, 
the industry remained struggling to increase its production and exports (Andrade et al. 
1997).  
Privatisation in the Brazilian steel sector, at a time when the industry globally was 
characterised by regionalism, did not facilitate a similarly profitable integration of 
domestic Brazilian companies into the world economy as in oil and mining (Paz 2015, 
Nem Singh 2012, 2014). The structural conditions in the sector – globally, i.e. regional 
networks, and locally, i.e. complex ownership patterns, were not conducive to creating 
internationally competitive firms out of existing previously state-owned companies. In 
addition, Brazilian steel was hampered by “the elimination of non-tariff barriers and 
the reduction of taxes on imports [which] stimulated a high import growth in Brazil” 
and exerted strong competitive pressure (Guarana et al. 2013: 6). The power of local 
private elites in this process, as demonstrated by the persistence of grupos and 
concentration of assets, must not be underestimated. Neoliberalising policies were the 
result of the intersection of the interests of local and global economic and political elites 
(Evans, 2008).  
The phase of privatisation in the global steel industry was followed by another phase 
of reorganisation from 2000 onwards which sets the scene for Lula’s new 
developmentalist policies. This era was characterised by the opening of new markets, 
in particular China, and by decentralised networks of production and trade through the 
rise of transnational steel companies. Increasingly, the hot and cold processes involved 
in steel production became geographically separated. Typically, the hot stages of 
production (low value added) would be located in areas of low production costs, i.e. 
emerging economies (Crossetti and Fernandes 2005). The geographical dispersion of 
production went hand in hand with growing financial integration and a consolidation 
of the industrial structure. A wave of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) led to both, 
consolidation and greater financial integration in the sector. While significant changes 
in the organisation of the sector had been predicted, the rise of steel makers from outside 
of Europe almost came as a surprise. Mittal Steel is a fitting illustration of global M&A 
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activity. Mittal’s dynamic strategy of acquisitions across the world and the merger with 
Arcelor created the first global steel company. The EU steel industry was no longer 
driving the change but being subject to it (and subject to a bidding war) (Slusarczyk et 
al., 2013, Bouquet and Ousey, 2008). The entrance of China into the global steel trade 
also meant shifting power balances, as it turned from importer to exporter increasing 
supply of semi-finished steels.  
Brazil has been increasingly integrated into these circuits of capital and 
commodities. Since the buying spree of the 1990s, the market structure of the Brazilian 
steel industry has been significantly modified. Not only has there been a concentration 
of ownership but the liberalisation policies of the 1990s also encouraged greater 
international involvement.  Foreign capital has particularly flown towards acquisition 
of and investment in coastal developments similar to the industrial projects of the 
1970s. The formerly 43 public and private companies (1990) have been restructured so 
that in 2006 10 companies were responsible for 90% of output (Gomes et al. 2006). The 
domestic re-organisation through mergers and acquisitions mirrored the M&A activity 
in the global steel sector.  
By 2015, the aforementioned group of 10 companies had reduced to three 
domestically led groups: Companhia Siderurgica Nacional (CSN), Usiminas, and 
Gerdau Açominas. The arrival of foreign capital, in particular the success of 
ArcelorMittal in entering the Brazilian market, and the increasingly important position 
of the mining company Vale as stakeholder in a number of steel ventures (e.g. Samarco, 
Thyssen Krupp Companhia Siderúrgica do Atlântico TKCSA, CSN, Usiminas) have 
characterised the reconfiguration of the steel sector since 2005. This development 
occurred with strong state support through BNDES loans. Almeida (2009) highlights 
how Luciano Coutinho, BNDES President, defended his (and BNDES’) strategy of 
supporting the concentration in the steel sector through the policy of supporting national 
champions3. Despite a rhetoric of support for national champions, however, between 
2005 and 2011, the steel industry (excluding Vale) never climbed into the top three of 
sectoral recipients of BNDES loans (Hochstetler and Montero, 2013). At the same time, 
ArcelorMittal has become the biggest steel producer in Brazil, accounting for 30.7%  
                                               
3
 Since 1995, with the exception of 2013, more than 90% of investments in the metal and steel sector 
by BNDES were received by the big steel companies according to BNDES data.  
of production in 2010. Overall, foreign capital had a stake in more than 50% of steel 
production in 2010 (Lopes 2011, see also table 2 below).  
The policy of fostering ‘national champions’ also included continuing efforts to 
keep a national Brazilian steel industry ‘safe’ from foreign takeovers. Corus’ failed 
takeover of CSN in 2002 illustrated the policy in practice. The suggested merger meant 
that Corus and its shareholders would retain 62.4% of the merged company and CSN 
and its shareholders would retain 37.6% of the new company. The merged company 
would have included both upstream (mining in BRA) and downstream (distribution by 
Corus) activities. It seemed to present a solution to the structural pressures of the steel 
sector: internationalisation and consolidation were necessary to deal with the problems 
of overcapacity and global competition. The merger, however, failed in the wake of the 
arrival of PT, Lula and new developmentalism in Brazilian politics. National control of 
the sector as an important political and economic asset became a key element of state 
industrial strategies: denationalisation via internationalisation was not to be allowed. 
As investor and provider of capital, the Brazilian state has facilitated the integration of 
Brazilian productive capital into the flows of foreign financial capital but within the 
limits of the national interest.  
Similar to the oil and mining sectors, strategies by Brazilian companies in the sector 
have been shaped by the aims of consecutive industrial policies. Both PDP and PBM 
focused on strengthening existing large companies in sectors seen to be competitive. In 
the steel sector this meant a focus on exporting semi-finished (low value added) steels 
for value enhancement in partner or subsidiary companies abroad (See Santos 2015 on 
CSN). At the same time, finished steels produced in Brazil would be destined for the 
domestic market, with expectations of rising domestic demand as a result of both 
upcoming mega events (World Cup and Olympics) and continued domestic 
redistributive policies. The risks associated with this strategy were identified as 
overcapacity in the global market, protectionist policies by other countried reducing 
access, environmental costs and the lack of ability to profit from margins from higher 
value added production (Crossetti and Fernandes 2005). Nevertheless, these risks were 
seen to be offset by the perceived positive interaction between an expanding domestic 
market and Brazil steel’s competitiveness in the global market. 
In reality, the risks anticipated above (Crossetti and Fernandes 2005) materialised, 
particularly following the global financial crisis of 2008. This left the Brazilian steel 
sector vulnerable to global volatility in demand and cheaper competitors abroad. 
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Consequently,  global competitiveness of domestic companies has seen a continuous 
decline since 2005. Between 2002 and 2013 the proportion of revenues generated from 
exports fell from 32.6% to 16% (Ganaka, Santos and Souza 2015). Export quantity of 
low value added steel products has decreased between 2005 and 2014, even if changing 
prices have cushioned the blow (see table 2 below). Interestingly, companies with 
foreign investors (ArcelorMittal and TKCSA) and subsidiaries abroad which focus on 
the fnishing stages of steel production (CSN) have continued to keep exports up (see 
table 2). In the early years after privatisation, Brazilian production of steel increased 
and with it indirect steel exports (World Steel Association 2013). This was not only the 
result of improved production techniques but, primarily, of a depreciation in currency. 
This highlights the vulnerability of the sector to currency volatility. Similarly, increases 
in productivity were primarily achieved through significant reduction in manpower 
(CNM, 2012). The same industrial policies which had encouraged export orientation of 
competitive domestic companies (PDP, PBM) also targeted economic development at 
home which meant rising demand for steel within Brazil. . At the same time, the income 
effects of the commodity boom also increased domestic demand for steel and by 2009, 
Brazil had experienced a significant rise in the imports of finishedsteels which 
exacerbated concerns over the competitiveness of domestic industry (World Steel 
Association 2013, see figure 2) and thus developmentalist aspirations.   
 
FIGURE 2: Indirect Steel Trade about here  
 
New developmentalism did not only promise economic change, it also promised 
social change with an increase in employment, income and participation in decision 
making for disadvantaged groups (Ricz 2015, Ebenau and Liberatore 2013). 
Employment in the steel sector, however, has remained volatile. Following an initial 
shedding of labour after privatisation, the sector saw an increase in employment during 
the Lula administration. Employment figures rose by 50% to approximately 700,000 
employees in the metal sector (Ganaka et al. 2015). The effects of the financial crisis 
led to steady decline in the metal sector from 2010 onwards. 2013 alone saw a reduction 
by 30,000 jobs in the metals sector (Ganaka et al. 2015). Similarly, wages in the steel 
sector4 have not kept up with the rise in wages in other strategic sectors (see figure 3 
below) and the wage profile has deteriorated since privatisation (see table 2 below).  
 
FIGURE 3: Nominal wage comparison in three strategic sectors about here 
 
Between 2001 and 2014, the rise in wages in steel production has been 34.5 % 
compared to 187.6 % in the extractive industries (IBGE, 2015). Since 1995, the 
proportion of those in steel production on low wages (measured in relation to the 
minimum wage, i.e. up to twice the minimum wage) has steadily increased while the 
proportion of those on high wages in the sector (five times the minimum wage and 
higher) has steadily decreased. Between 2001 and 2014, there was a 11.9% increase in 
those paid in the lowest category (see table 2 below). Average wages for workers in 
steel production are the lowest in the metal manufacturing industry (CNM 2012). In 
comparison, workers in steel earned 36% of the wage of workers in aircraft 
manufacturing in 2010 (CNM 2012). It is important to highlight that production is 
concentrated in few business groups, and especially the business groups most likely to 
be supported by BNDES investments and loans, whereas workers in the manufacturing 
of steel products are dispersed across a high number of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (CNM, 2012). The data also shows continued regional inequalities with the 
proportion of workers with the lowest income concentrated in the Northeast compared 
to a higher proportion of high income employees in the South East, Brazil’s 
economically most advanced region. Employment and wage data would therefore 
question the socially developmental effects of new developmentalist policies in steel. 
In addition, worker representatives in the sector have highlighted the need for national 
action to guarantee minimum workers’ rights, a stronger emphasis on the development 
and training of steel workers and attention to the risks of insecure employment relations 
(CNM, 2012).  
Similarly, despite attempts to use national champions as instruments of regional 
policy, the installation of new steel plants and the promise of employment brought their 
own problems of local community resistance. It is important to note that none of the 
                                               
4
 The steel sector here comprises ‘basic metals’ (steel production) and metal products. The 
wider metal manufacturing industry also includes the sectors of manufacturing of means of 
transport (aircraft, automotive and shipbuilding), electric and electronic manufacturing, 
machine manufacturing. 
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previously state-owned steel companies has been positioned in a similar way to the 
previously state-owned national champions in the mining and the oil sector. Vale 
(mining) and Petrobras (oil) have both, at different times, been turned into quasi-
regional development agencies. New steel projects have been either led by Vale or 
included Vale as a minority shareholder rather than the established steel companies 
(such as the previously state-owned CSN or privately owned Gerdau). These 
development projects, however, have been marred by claims of a lack of accountability 
in their planning and implementation. Continuing conflicts over the exclusion of 
residents in the deliberation and support for new industrial projects have highlighted 
issues over the balancing of private, public and state interests in new developmentalist 
practices. While greenfield steel projects might bring industrial employment, they have 
been located in the coastal areas of Rio de Janeiro and Espirito Santo and threaten local 
marine habitats and traditional forms of work. At the same time, these conflicts have 
mobilized social groups previously considered disempowered (cf. Santos and Milanez, 
2015, Doering et al., 2015). This process of political empowerment has led to a number 
of strategies used by advocacy groups addressing public, private and civil society 
actors. In the first instance, this is expressed in the use of the Public Prosecutor Office 
questioning environmental performance and environmental licensing processes. 
TKCSA’s steel mill in the south of Rio de Janeiro, for example, attracted sustained 
criticism over the violation of environmental rights of residents prompting the denial 
of a licence to operate without significant improvement to environmental monitoring 
and protection measures (PACS 2012, Doering et al., 2015). Similarly, other steel 
companies are recurrent parties in front of public inquiries (e.g. ArcelorMittal in 
Espirito Santo for air pollution). In terms of private actors, critical shareholder groups 
have been used to question corporate strategies. Here again, TKCSA is the foremost 
example.  
The following table summarises the comparison between the steel, oil and mining 
sectors as presented above along the lines of central new developmentalist objectives 
(strong role of the state, internationalisation, export competitiveness and socially 
inclusive distribution of rent). Data was presented on an organizational level to 
illustrate the operation of new developmentalist strategies and policies. We examined 
the role of the state in strategic sectors and the resulting forms of ownership in each 
industry. This highlighted the varying degrees of foreign capital entering each sector. 
In addition the discussion of internationalization of dominant companies highlighted 
the successful strategies of companies in all sectors as demonstrated by the ranking of 
multinational companies by foreign assets. The table then presents data on a sectoral 
level. Here export competitiveness is compared across the sectors, in terms of quantity, 
value and contribution to exports in the Brazilian trade balance. Employment data was 
only available at the level of the extractive industry as a whole (combining oil and 
mining) which is compared with steel production.  
 
TABLE 2: Socioeconomic Trends in three strategic sectors under New 
Developmentalism about here 
 
The empirical insights outlined in the present article point to the different 
characteristics of new developmentalist policies and highlight that while policies of 
industrial restructuring were successful in inserting steel into global flows of steel 
production, social upgrading effects have been lagging behind. The international 
division of steel production seems to reproduce a familiar hierarchy of economic 
powers. The developed nations predominantly concentrate on the finishing and high-
value added stages of the production process and the developing and emerging 
economies focus on the production of low-value added raw and semi-finished steel 
(Andrade et al., 2007). This context hampers steel workers’ aspirations for higher 
income and higher skill-levels, as well as encouraging the exploitation of local 
environmental resources. The following section will discuss the empirical data 
presented above for our understanding of notions of embedded autonomy (Evans 1995, 
Almeida et al. 2014) as outcome of new developmentalism.  
 
5. Discussion: new developmentalism as an effective developmental paradigm?  
 
New developmentalism had sectorally specific outcomes. In terms of ownership 
structures, oil and mining are domestically dominated by Petrobras as a state-owned 
company and Vale as a company with the state as minority shareholder. In steel, the 
state has mainly functioned as financier even though complex crossholdings in the 
sector have enabled its involvement as minority shareholder. In addition, foreign capital 
is strong in its presence through ArcelorMittal as the biggest steel producer and foreign 
stakes in Usiminas. The presence of MNCs in steel has implications for public-private 
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alliances in the sector, particularly in the context of technological upgrading (Schneider 
2013, Doner and Schneider 2016, see also table 3 below). While all sectors had been 
identified for state support, coalitions for upgrading were easier to foster in the 
domestically dominated sectors of oil and mining. Domestic steel companies did not 
benefit from specially targeted policies (Ganaka et al. 2015) but competed with foreign 
owned companies for funds (Almeida et al. 2014, BNDES data). 
In addition, new developmentalist policies achieved the internationalization of 
the steel, oil and mining sectors, albeit in different ways. In oil and mining, dominant 
national companies with strong state involvement have benefited from state regulation 
to insert themselves into global production networks. They took up positions as 
exporters of low value goods, invested into access to resources abroad and became 
partners for foreign capital to respond to government objectives of technology transfer 
into Brazil (Almeida et al. 2014). In steel, national companies also focused on export 
of low value added goods but acquired interests for value enhancement abroad. At the 
same time, foreign capital entered Brazil in a resource seeking strategy. This has 
exposed the Brazilian steel industry to risks as a result of overcapacity of low value 
added steel in the global market. At the same time, all of these sectors remain vulnerable 
to global demand cycles and commodity prices. In this sense, new developmentalist 
policies have fostered embedded vulnerabilities of domestic champions to 
developments in global production networks rather than embedded autonomy.  
 Workers in the extractive sectors have, through rising wages, been able to 
benefit from the commodity boom. Therefore, cleavages between foreign and domestic 
capital, and business and labour, which have been identified as inhibiting the emergence 
of upgrading coalitions (cf. Doner and Schneider, 2016) have been less pronounced. 
The fragmentation of the steel sector between foreign and domestic capital, however, 
potentially has a negative effect on upgrading institutions. According to Schneider 
(2013) MNCs are less involved in domestic projects of upgrading as their interests in 
profit maximisation can be achieved in other locations of their operations. In addition, 
workers have not been able to benefit from the insertion of the steel industry into global 
production networks. In contrast, they have experienced a very slow rise in real wages 
and decrease in employment as a result of the crisis of overcapacity in the steel market. 
This has been particularly pronounced since 2014 and can be seen as a result of an 
industrial policy which focused on export competitiveness. As a result, export 
orientation – as manifestation of new developmental attempts at internationalisation – 
is highly contentious and contradictory in its outcomes (Nem Singh 2010, Milanez and 
Santos, 2015). As Almeida et al. (2014: 32) highlight: “It is not clear whether and how 
much the policy of promoting national champions in existing sectors has greater social 
than private benefits […].” The benefits are unevenly distributed between the ‘national 
champion’ companies, multinational companies, their shareholders and labour. While 
national champion companies are winning in oil and mining and multinational 
companies and their shareholders profit in steel, labour gain in extractive industries but 
less so in steel. 
We have argued that social and environmental impacts of new 
developmentalism need to be taken into account. One of the central tenets of new 
developmentalism has been its inclusion of previously disadvantaged and 
disempowered groups in a new social contract (Ricz 2015). The discussion above has 
shown how socio-environmental conflicts continue in all sectors. A mapping exercise 
in 2010 identified that 12% of the 343 recorded socio-environmental conflicts in Brazil 
were linked to the steel and extractive industries (Fiocruz 2010). In this sense, the focus 
on participation and re-democratization has made exclusion of different social groups 
from decision-making processes visible and faciltiated resistance to extractivist 
corporate strategies. The growing importance of NGOs as political actors demanding 
accountability and transparency needs to be considered a central element to the new 
developmental paradigm – if not as outcome, then as mediating element (cf. Almeida 
et al., 2014, Devlin and Moguillansky 2012). Similarly, the increased appropriation of 
corporate practices for activist means on an international level, e.g. the growing 
importance of critical shareholder groups and the publication of ‘unsustainability’ 
reports mimicking company sustainability reports (Santos and Milanez, 2015), need to 
be seen as positive outcomes of the internationalization of Brazilian companies. This 
has facilitated the internationalization of the resistance movements against them. At the 
same time, such alternative organisation(s) invite attention and co-optation efforts by 
the affected companies. The oil sector is also characterised by mobilization of civil 
society. In this case, however, focus has been less on the socio-environmental effects 
of its operations but their political nature. The driving forces here have not been 
disempowered groups but the state in its role as prosecutor. While close political links 
in the sector facilitated an upgrading coalition, close links between industrial elites and 
politicians here created an environment conducive to corruption. Overall, these 
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developments and the recent protests against and ultimate end of the Rousseff 
administration have highlighted the fragile nature of the new social contract. 
Overall, new developmentalist strategies and policies in steel, oil and mining 
have achieved the embedding of Brazilian companies and Brazilian labour and civil 
society into global production networks. They have left each of these sectors, however, 
vulnerable to either the global or domestic ‘requirements’ of production. The particular 
articulation of power relations between foreign and domestic capital, industrial and 
political elites and business and civil society actors have contributed in each sector to a 
situation of ‘embedded vulnerability’, rather than the aim of embedded autonomy as a 
characteristic of development (Evans 1995). The following table (table 3) summarises 
our arguments.  
 





New developmentalism is defined as a developmental paradigm characterised by 
export-orientation and a drive for internationalization but with a strong role for the state, 
and striving for socio-environmental inclusion and equality. We set out to examine the 
sectorally specific trajectories of new developmentalism in the Brazilian context. In this 
respect, the article makes an empirical contribution by detailing developments in the 
Brazilian steel sector, redressing the relative neglect of this sector in favour of the 
otherwise dominant discussions of oil and mining (Nem Singh and Massi, 2016, Nem 
Singh, 2013, Paz, 2015, Milanez and Santos, 2013, Milanez and Santos, 2015, Almeida 
et al., 2014). The article has consciously included the socio-environmental dimension 
as an addition to previously economically focused discussions of new 
developmentalism (Ebenau and Liberatore, 2013 are an exception here).  
Global economic and political forces have as much an influence on the 
dominance of developmental paradigms as do changes internal to the state and the 
nation. Industrial policies and developmental paradigms such as new developmentalism 
are shaped by increased global interdependencies as much as new demands of 
accountability by domestic social groups, in particular in emerging and medium-
income countries (Bresser-Pereira 2006, Erber 2010, 2011, Ricz 2015). This illustrates 
how economic and political changes go hand in hand and the ways in which neoliberal 
and even post-neoliberal projects “used the tools provided by generic globalization (…) 
to construct a global system of domination” (Evans, 2008: 275) (cf. Ebenau and 
Liberatore 2013, Kröger 2012, Yates and Bakker 2014).  
In this article we have identified the potentially contradictory outcomes of a 
developmental paradigm which rhetorically supports social inclusion and participation 
via redistributive measures but in practice facilitates the integration of local productive 
capital into low technology structural positions in global networks via state and local 
economic policies. Social policies in Brazil, such as cash transfers through Bolsa 
Familia, have contributed to a decrease in inequality (the Gini coefficient fell from 60 to 
54.7 in between 1990 and 2009) and in poverty. This, however, has been achieved in 
parallel with (if not inspite of) economic policies which have been characterised by “the 
displacement of the social and ecological costs that the quest for competitivess 
produces” (Ebenau and Liberatore 2013: 108) onto the most vulnerable in society. At 
the same time, they pose a danger for a social and political consensus as recent 
developments of political instability in Brazil have shown.  
The contribution of the article lies in its sectoral analysis and the 
demonstration of sectorally specific new developmentalist strategies of the Brazilian 
state. As Schneider (2015: 4) has argued:  
Political leadership or will cannot help much without taking into consideration 
existing constellations of institutions and organisations. Moreover, given the 
privileged position of big business in most political systems, their structures, 
preferences and capabilities merit special attention in any macro-political analysis.  
The article has paid particular attention to the interaction between business and the state 
while also giving space to civil society actors. In this sense, it provides a more nuanced 
reading of state-business relations in emerging economies than has been afforded by 
national-level discussions of Varieties of Capitalism approaches which highlight 
similarities across sectors characterised by commodity and low value added goods 
production.  
The article also highlights the insertion of the Brazilian state as an economic 
actor into a particular global economic order whose strategies are thus also influenced 
by external forces. The state therefore needs to be seen in relation to other states and 
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national strategic alliances and as element of a particular (economically) strategic 
alliance which is not necessarily nationally embedded. This is where the tensions 
between the state’s social and political embeddedness and its economic disembedding 
strategies arise. This also prepares the ground for an analysis of the spatially diverse 
effects of new developmental strategies and makes an argument for pursuing a 
geographical political economy (Gereffi 2013) to uncover the continuing territorial 
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Figure 1: Brazil’s reforms (source: Baumann, 2001: Figure 1, 153) 
 
Table 1: Paradigms of Development in Brazil  
Paradigm Developmentalism 
1950 - 1970 
Neoliberalism (1973 – present) New Developmentalism (2002 – 
present)  
Motto  Structural Change Structural adjustment Productive Transformation with 
social equity 
Purpose  Modernization via Industrialisation  Modernization via privatization  Modernization via 
internationalization 
View of development Requires explicit political will and 
state intervention rationalized 
through planning process 
 
 
Development against capitalism: 
modern industrial society but not 
capitalist 
 
Spontaneous outcome of market 
forces and free operation of prices 
as allocative mechanism 
 
 
Development of capitalism 
Deliberate process in which social 
and political energies are focused in 
support of export drive and 
achieving dynamic entry into world 
economic flows 
 
Development alongside capitalism: 
liberal capitalism plus achieving 
basic social and environmental 
goals 
Role of the State  
 
Structural reforms  
Steer capital accumulation  
Develop key industrial sectors 
(demiurge/ midwife) 
Protect economy from external 
fluctuations  
Importance of centralized state 
structures 
Provide minimum conditions for the 
market to function (custodian): 
private property, enforce contracts, 
maintain order, collect data, provide 
limited safety net 
Generate social and political 
consensus 
Increase competitiveness of exports 
(clusters, public-private 
partnerships) (midwife/ husband)  
Facilitate adaptability and upgrading 
of labour force 
Produce social cohesion – 
importance of decentralised 
structures 
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Instruments of ‘insertion’ into 
world economy 
Import substitution Export orientation – extractionism 
(comparative advantages) 
Export orientation – develop 
capacity to export medium value 
manufactured goods and high value 
added primary goods  
Selective outward orientation/ 
internationalization 
New regional political economy: 
regional integration and autonomy 
from International Financial 
Institutions 
Outcome – position of state in 
global production networks 
Position of power through internal 
orientation 
Embedded via state ownership of 
productive capital  
Value creation via employment and 
import substitution 




Value creation via market forces – 
competitiveness 
Position of power negotiating market 
openness and national 
developmental agendas via 
(decentralised) industrial policy 
Embedded via provision of capital – 
golden shares 
Value creation via upskilling, 
industrial upgrading and 
redistribution 
Role of economy vs politics Economy is subordinate to politics Politics is subordinate to economy Political and cultural space is 
shaped by requirements of 
globalization 
 




Figure 2: Indirect trade in steel, thousand tonnes, finished steel equivalent, 1970 - 2011 
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FIGURE 3: Nominal Wage Comparison in three strategic sectors 
 
 










1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Nominal Wage Comparison (South East), 1999 - 2014, in 
R$
extractive industries (oil and mining) metal industry national average
TABLE 2: Socioeconomic Trends in three strategic sectors under New Developmentalism 
 Steel  Oil Mining  
Role of the state and ownership    
Dominant domestically owned 
companies 
Foreign capital participation 




Usiminas, TKCSA  
ArcelorMittal (AM) 
 
Petrobras (60.51% state 
ownership)  
Vale (33.06% state ownership) 
 
Samarco (Vale (50%), BHP 
Billiton (50%)) 
Internationalization 
Market share of production (2010) AM 30.7%, Gerdau 24.8%, 
Usiminas 22%, CSN, 14.9%, 
TKCSA 1%  
Petrobras 92%  Vale 79.8%, Vale minority 
stakeholder in companies 
producing 20.2% 
Ranking in Transnationality Index 
based on foreign assets 
Gerdau: 2 Petrobras: 3 Vale: 1 
Export Competitiveness 
Trend in Export Quantity  
(Jan 2005 – Jan 2014) 
-27.7%  
 
+51.4%  +62.7% 
Trend in Export Value  +211%  +2176%  +815%  
 37 | P a g e  
 
(Jan 2005 – Jan 2014) 
Contribution to Brazil trade balance 
(exports) (2014) 
AM            0.69%  
CSN           0.76% 
TKCSA      0.89% 
Petrobras            5.79%  Vale             9.1%  
Socially inclusive distribution of rent Extractive industries 
Trend in employment (2001 – 2014) +37.4%  +39% 
Trend in real wages (2001 – 2014) +34.46%  
 
+187.62% 
Trend in wage structure (2001 – 2014) 
- Up to twice minimum wage 
- 2 -5 times minimum wage 











Sources: own elaboration from: company information, Gurmendi (2010), Ministerio do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comercio Exterior, Dom 




TABLE 3: Characteristics of New Developmentalism in three strategic sectors 
 
Outcomes of New 
Developmentalism 
Steel  Oil Mining 






Business Actors  Internationalized 
domestic business 










business group with 
state as minority 
shareholder 
Civil Society Actors Localised networks 











Constrained by MNC 
interests 
Supported by state 
through local 
content rules 
To be supported by 
state (ongoing 
discussions) 
Vulnerabilities Arising out of low 
value added focus in 
global production 
networks 
Arising out of 
embeddedness in 
domestic politics 
Arising out of 
commodity cycles 
and embeddedness in 
domestic politics 
Source: own elaboration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
